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ABSTRACT 
  
 This paper formally explores the optimal length of copyright protection when the value of 
an intellectual work changes over time due to depreciation and value-enhancing ex-post 
investments.  The first main finding is that, in the case of a single project, granting infinitely-
lived copyright protection maximizes social welfare when the return on ex-post investments is 
high relative to the return on the initial investment.  We also provide simulation results of our 
model for the case of multiple heterogeneous projects that show how social welfare varies with 
the length of copyright protection and the returns on initial and ex-post investments.  We then 
consider what our framework says concerning the social-welfare effects of the 1998 Copyright 
Term Extension Act.  Here we show that, depending on the importance of ex-post investments, 
the act may have either increased or decreased social welfare.  Our final analysis considers the 
social-welfare implications of replacing fixed-length copyright protection with Landes and 
Posner’s (2003) idea of indefinitely-renewable copyright protection.  We find that implementing 
indefinitely-renewable copyright protection frequently increases social welfare provided the 
returns on ex-post investments are sufficiently large.  We also provide a briefy history of 
Disney’s Mickey Mouse and argue that the history of that character matches quite well with the 
predictions of our theoretical approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional economic reasoning regarding copyright length is based on the interaction 
between two opposing economic forces.  On the one hand, an increase in copyright duration 
promotes innovation by increasing the incentives to create, since monopoly rents can be 
extracted for longer periods of time.  That is, increasing copyright duration decreases what is 
typically referred to as the underproduction loss.  On the other hand, an increase in copyright 
duration creates social-welfare losses due to underutilization since the deadweight loss from 
monopoly continues for longer periods.  Thus, in the standard argument the policy maker’s 
problem is to select a copyright length that strikes an optimal balance between these two 
opposing effects.    
One critical assumption in the standard approach to optimal copyright policy is that all 
investments that create value are made up front.  Evaluating copyright policy in this context 
yields that, since the discounted value of monopoly profits far in the future is close to zero, these 
far in the future profits do not have a significant impact on the incentives to create new works.  
The natural conclusion, as discussed for example in Akerlof et al. (2002), is that lengthy 
copyright protection makes no economic sense since extending copyright protection in this way 
has little impact on reducing the underproduction loss but can substantially increase the 
underutilization loss. 
In what follows we construct a model that takes a distinctly different approach to this 
issue.  As indicated, the standard approach assumes that all creation costs are incurred up front.  
We argue that this assumption, common to the mainstream literature on copyright, does not hold 
in many important real-world situations.  In many cases, the value of a creative work can be 
augmented by value-enhancing investments in later periods.  As discussed in more detail below, 
our approach is closely related to Landes and Posner’s (2003) arguments that additional 
investments in creative works and other benefits of ownership are important.   
Consider, for example, Disney’s Mickey Mouse.  While Mickey Mouse was created 
during the 1920s, his appearance has significantly changed over time.  One of the primary 
reasons Disney feels the need to change Mickey’s characteristics over time is changing 
demographics and social values.  Thus, Disney maintains Mickey Mouse’s popularity and 
quality via ex-post investments in the character, using expenditures on focus groups, artists, 
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marketers, etc.1  If Disney did not have copyright protection, the resulting competitive market 
would not match Disney’s level of ex-post investments in the character.  Without copyright 
protection, all firms in the industry that use the character would potentially benefit from the 
investments of other firms, so the market would underinvest in equilibrium – a classic free-rider 
problem. 
In other words, in order to avoid ex-post underinvestment in the quality of a copyrighted 
work, it is helpful if there is copyright protection of the initial creation.  Thus, one can 
potentially justify very long-term copyright protection and retroactive copyright extensions as 
means to avoid the free-rider problem associated with ex-post investments.  It is worth noting 
that Disney announced a major “make-over” for Mickey Mouse in 1998 shortly after the United 
States Congress passed the “Copyright Term Extension Act” (CTEA) which extended extant 
copyright protection for an additional twenty years.  It is doubtful that Disney would have 
invested as much into mainaining the value of Mickey Mouse (and other characters) after 1998 if 
the Copyright Term Extention Act had not passed. 
Our paper formalizes this argument and investigates its implications.  Our first analysis 
shows that for any discount rate, depreciation rate, and initial cost of creation, there are creations 
for which infinitely-lived copyright protection is socially preferred to any finitely-lived 
copyright.  Traditionally, only the costs to create the original product and the discount rate are 
elements in determining the optimal length of copyright protection.  In contrast, in our analysis 
investments in maintaining the value of the product over time are also an important factor.  More 
specifically, the magnitude of the returns on ex-post investments in relation to the return on the 
initial investment is important.  Because low initial investment returns imply low initial quality 
levels, the welfare loss from monopoly underutilization is small for low levels of initial 
investment return.  As a result, holding all else fixed, infinitely-lived copyright protection is 
optimal when a copyrighted work has a low return on initial investment.  In addition, the welfare 
loss due to underproduction from finitely-lived copyright protection is greater when ex-post 
investment returns are higher.  Thus, holding all else fixed, infinitely-lived copyright protection 
is optimal when the returns on ex-post investments are high. 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Wasko (2001) for a discussion. 
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As is true for our first analysis, traditional analyses of optimal copyright length assume a 
single product or a set of homogeneous products.  However, such an approach misses important 
real-world complexities that make it inappropriate to serve as a reliable guide to public policy.  
In our second analysis, we analyze a regulator’s decision when creative works are heterogeneous 
with regard to both initial investment returns and ex-post investment returns.  Simulations of this 
model indicate that when quality enhancing ex-post investments are not possible, the optimal 
length of copyright protection is finite and, in fact, short relative to real-world copyright length.  
When ex-post investments are possible, social welfare as a function of copyright duration first 
increases, reaches a maximum, and then declines with the length of copyright protection.  As the 
length of copyright protection increases even further and firms are encouraged to invest more in 
ex-post quality improvements, social welfare begins to increase again, finally reaching some 
asymptotic value.  The simulations also indicate that, given the presence of ex-post investments, 
infinite-length copyright protection can be optimal under quite plausible assumptions concerning 
the parameters of the model. 
In our simulation analysis, we also study the implications of the CTEA.  Our analysis 
suggests that, before the act, the duration of copyright protection was already lengthy, and 
expected total surplus was close to its asymptotic value.  Thus, the model suggests that the 
adoption of the CTEA induced a small increase in social welfare from new works.  Welfare 
effects of the act on existing works are ambiguous.  Retroactive copyright extension decreases 
social welfare associated with existing works if the existing works have high commercial value 
primarily because of high initial quality levels.  On the other hand, retroactive copyright 
extension increases social welfare associated with existing works if the existing works 
maintained high commercial value due to the monopolist’s ex-post investments on quality.  
Overall, combining our findings for new and existing works, our analysis shows that the CTEA 
could either have increased or decreased social welfare depending on the importance of ex-post 
investment returns.   
Although there are projects that require long-term copyright protection to be undertaken, 
other works need only a few years of copyright protection to be undertaken.  Landes and Posner 
(2003) argue that, because of this type of heterogeneity, the optimal policy concerning copyright 
protection might be to have indefinitely-renewable copyright protection.  Under indefinitely-
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renewable copyright protection, a work’s creator can renew copyright protection indefinitely by 
making periodic payments.  Our last analysis addresses this issue.  Our analysis of this issue 
suggests that indefinitely-renewable copyright protection can improve social welfare provided 
projects are sufficiently heterogeneous and the returns on ex-post investments are sufficiently 
high.  However, our analysis also suggests that indefinitely-renewable copyright protection can 
hurt social welfare if these conditions are not satisfied. 
In summary, our analysis shows that incorporating value-enhancing ex-post investments 
into the framework, which we believe to be a very realistic feature, changes the conclusions 
concerning optimal copyright policy in important ways.  First, in contrast to the standard 
argument in which very long-term copyright protection cannot be optimal because discounting 
means monopoly profits in far-off periods have little effect on the incentives to create, the 
presence of value-enhancing ex-post investments means very long and possibly even infinite-
length copyright protection can be optimal.  Second, in contast to the standard economic analysis 
of the issue such as in Akerlof et al. (2002), to the extent that ex-post investments are sufficiently 
important the passage of the CTEA may have increased rather than decreased social welfare.  
Third, in the presence of value-enhancing ex-post investments, Landes and Posner’s suggestion 
of indefinitely-renewable copyright protection can be optimal given projects are heterogeneous 
and the returns on ex post investments are sufficiently high. 
As a final introductory point, the goal of the paper is not to show that from a real-world 
perspective optimal copyright length is necessarily very long or possibly even infinite.  Rather, 
our goal is to show that, because of the possibility of ex-post investments, the issue of optimal 
copyright length is more complicated than suggested by standard analyses such as found in 
Akerlof et al. (2002).  With this goal in mind and to help make the argument easy to follow, in 
choosing a model to investigate we intentionally abstract away from some factors that can 
potentially serve to ameliorate the effects that the presence of ex-post investments can have on 
the length of optimal copyright protection. 
For example, we assume free entry and Bertrand competition after the expiration of 
copyright protection, so once copyright protection has expired ex-post investments drop to zero.  
This assumption means that in our model there is a large return to long copyright protection due 
to increased ex-post investments.  In alternative specifications ex-post investments would drop 
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but not drop to zero after copyright expiration, with the result that the return to long copyright 
protection due to increased ex-post investments would be positive but smaller.  As indicated, we 
assume free entry and Bertrand competition after copyright expiration and we make other related 
assumptions both because these assumptions simplify the analysis and because they allow us to 
more easily show that ex-post investments can be important for optimal copyright length.  We 
come back to this issue in the Conclusion. 
The outline for the paper is as follows.  Section II reviews the relevant literature.  Section 
III presents the model and provides some preliminary results.  The main analysis is in Section 
IV, where specific attention is paid to the conditions in which infinitely-lived copyright 
protection is optimal and the implications of our analysis for the welfare effects of the CTEA.  
Section V analyzes the optimality of indefinitely-renewable copyright protection.  Section VI 
discusses the case of Disney’s Mickey Mouse and argues that the history of this character 
matches quite well with the theoretical approach taken in this paper.  Section VII presents 
concluding remarks.    
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 The economic reasoning regarding optimal copyright length is typically based on the 
interaction of two opposing economic effects: incentives to create and monopoly 
underutilization.  An increase in copyright duration promotes innovation and increases the 
supply of works by allowing the authors to extract monopoly rents for longer periods.  However, 
an increase in copyright duration also creates welfare losses because copyrighted works are 
charged above competitive prices for longer periods.  Discussions and analyses that emphasize 
this trade-off can be found in Arrow (1962) and Hirshleifer and Riley (1979).2  While it is 
generally agreed that these two effects are important, there is disagreement among economists 
concerning the length of copyright protection that strikes an optimal balance between the two 
effects.  This disagreement can be clearly seen in discussions and analyses that followed passage 
of the 1998 CTEA.  Before the act, the length of copyright protection was seventy-five years for 
                                                     
2 Novos and Waldman (1984) provide a formal analysis of copyright protection along these lines but do not focus 
on copyright duration.  This trade-off also appears in the literature on patent length.  See, for example, Nordhaus 
(1969), Scherer (1972), and Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). 
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works for hire and fifty years after the author’s death for works produced individually.  The act 
extended the duration of copyright protection an additional twenty years for each type of work. 
 In their amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court of the United States, Akerlof et al. 
(2002) question the economic rationale behind the CTEA.  They argue that the economic 
incentives from the CTEA’s extension of copyright protection are insignificant.  In particular, in 
their analysis extending copyright duration from seventy-five to ninety-five years creates an 
additional compensation of 0.47% under an assumed discount rate of seven percent.  The authors 
argue that such a small increase in compensation is unlikely to have a significant impact on the 
supply of new works.3  Akerlof et al. further argue that the retroactive nature of the extension 
makes the CTEA even more problematic.  Welfare-enhancing benefits of retroactive extensions 
are not clear since there is no effect on works that have already been created.  A retroactive 
extension might in theory increase the supply of new works if creators believe that the duration 
of copyright protection would be extended in the future.  But the authors argue that the impact of 
these expectations on compensation is very small as well because there is uncertainty concerning 
future extensions.  Furthermore, retroactive copyright extensions increase the costs to current 
creators of derivative works.  Akerlof et al. conclude that the negative welfare effects of the 
CTEA clearly outweigh the questionable benefits of the act. 
 Liebowitz and Margolis (2005) disagree with the above analysis arguing that Akerlof et 
al. have overlooked important factors.  Liebowitz and Margolis emphasize that if the supply of 
new works was very elastic under the copyright terms in place before the act, then the act could 
have increased the number of creative works substantially, and thus have had a positive effect on 
social welfare.  The authors elaborate by arguing that many works have relatively short lives and 
these works are of low commercial value.  On the other hand, the works with longer lives have 
higher commercial value and might be sensitive to changes in copyright duration.  In support of 
their arguments, Liebowitz and Margolis study a sample of books published in the 1920s and 
show that forty-one percent of all books and fifty-four percent of best sellers remained in print 
after fifty-eight years.  The authors suggest that further empirical analysis is necessary before 
drawing any firm conclusions concerning the welfare effects of the CTEA.  
                                                     
3 See Varian (2005) for another discussion along these lines. 
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 Landes and Posner (2003) argue that the CTEA can be rationalized because there are 
benefits from copyright ownership in addition to the provision of incentives needed for the initial 
creation of a work (see also Posner (2005)).  For example, ownership might preclude the 
possibility of misuse of a copyrighted work.  Also, a creation in the public domain may be 
overused, whereas ownership of the work deters “overgrazing” by providing incentives for the 
copyright owner to prevent a premature decline in the commercial value of the work.  They also 
suggest that even retroactive copyright extensions can be beneficial since owners of copyrighted 
works incur maintenance costs and, most importantly from our perspective, make additional 
investments that enhance the value of the original work. 
 Another important part of Landes and Posner’s argument is the claim that indefinitely-
renewable copyright protection can improve upon the current system of fixed-length copyright 
protection.4  To support their proposal, Landes and Posner conduct an empirical analysis of 
copyrights and renewals for the last one-hundred years.  They find that the average life 
expectancy for copyrights is about fifteen years and that copyright renewals are sensitive to 
registration fees.  They suggest that under renewal fees somewhat higher than present 
registration fees, only a few works – those for which there are substantial social benefits of 
ownership – would be renewed for a long period of time.  The rest of the works would enter the 
public domain soon after the works are created.5 
 Our paper formally investigates some of the main ideas in Landes and Posner’s important 
work.  We begin by constructing a model that captures the idea of ex-post value-enhancing 
investments.  We show that Landes and Posner are correct concerning the importance of such 
investments in causing optimal copyright protection to be long.  That is, if the returns on such 
investments are high, then very long and possibly even infinitely-lived copyright protection can 
be optimal.  We also formally consider their proposal of indefinitely-renewable copyright 
protection.  Here we show that Landes and Posner are correct, i.e., indefinitely-renewable 
                                                     
4 A related proposal is put forth in Rappaport (2002). 
 
5 As indicated, Landes and Posner’s analysis is based on the registration-fee and renewal-fee system that is 
currently in place.  To give you a sense of how the system works, the current initial registration fee is $30 and 
currently for works initially produced on or after 1964 but before 1978 registration can be renewed after twenty-
eight years for a fee of $60.  Registration and renewal are not required for copyright protection but offer some legal 
benefits. 
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copyright protection can be optimal, although this is not true in all cases.  Further, we identify 
the conditions needed for indefinitely-renewable copyright protection to be the optimal policy. 
 
III. MODEL AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 In this section we first present our model and then provide a preliminary analysis.  In 
Section IV we use the model to investigate the optimal length of copyright protection.  In 
Section V we then employ the model to investigate indefinitely-renewable copyright protection. 
 
A) The Model 
 In this subsection we develop a continuous-time model for optimal copyright length.  Let 
Q(t) denote the product’s quality at time t, where the quality of the product depreciates at rate δ, 
0<δ<1.  Denote by h and α the monopolist’s investment in the initial quality level and the return 
on a unit of initial investment.  The monopolist’s choice of an initial quality level is given by 
Q(0)=αh.  The cost of creating the initial product is z+g(h), where z≥0 is a fixed cost of 
undertaking the project and g(h) is the variable cost with g(0)=0, g′(0)=0, g′(h)>0 and g′′(h)>0 
for all h>0.  The monopolist can also invest ex-post in the product’s quality at any time t, where 
i(t) denotes the instantaneous ex-post investment at time t.  The instantaneous cost of ex-post 
quality investment at time t is given by c(i(t)), where c(0)=0, c′(0)=0, c′(i(t))>0 and c′′(i(t))>0 for 
all i(t)>0.  The law of motion for quality is Q′(t)=-δQ(t)+γi(t), where γ≥0 represents the return on 
a unit of ex-post investment. 
 The instantaneous inverse demand function is given by P(x(t),Q(t),t)=Q(t)(1-f(x(t)).  Note 
that x(t) is instantaneous output, 1-f(x(t)) is the inverse demand when the quality of the product 
equals one, and f(x) is normalized so that 
max
0
x∫ (1-f(x))dx=1.  The discount factor is r>0.  
Finally, we assume the marginal cost of production is zero and let T denote the length of 
copyright protection. 
 The timing of events is as follows.  After observing the length of copyright protection, a 
profit-maximizing monopolist draws α and γ from the cumulative distribution function F(α,γ).  
Next, the monopolist chooses whether or not to undertake the initial project.  If the project is 
undertaken, the monopolist chooses an initial investment level, h, ex-post investments, i(t), and a 
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price for each period, P(t).6  If the project is not undertaken, then no ex-post investments are 
possible and the monopolist receives zero profits.  Note further that after the expiration of 
copyright protection, there is a pool of firms any of which can make ex-post investments in 
quality and any of which can sell the product.  We further assume Bertrand competition in this 
post-copyright-protection time period.   
 Given the above sequence of events, the monopolist’s problem can be described as the 
following optimal control problem.7 
})())0((max,0max{
0
zhgQV
h
−−
≥
 
∫ −−= T rttitP dtetictxtPQV
0
)(),(
)))(()()((max))0((      (1) 
s.t. )()()(' titQtQ γδ +−= ,  hQ α=)0( , 0)( =Ti  
After period T, our assumption of Bertrand competition between the potential sellers means that, 
independent of the current quality, the price of the product falls to marginal cost which in our 
model equals zero.  Thus, abstracting away from expenditures on ex-post investments in quality, 
both the original monopolist’s profits and profits of each of the potential entrants is zero after the 
expiration of copyright protection.  Further, since abstracting away from expenditures on ex-post 
investments firms earn zero profits independent of the level of current quality, we also have that 
all ex-post quality investments stop after the expiration of copyright protection.8   
 Denote the monopolist’s optimal initial investment, ex-post investment, price, and quality 
paths by h*, i*(t), P*(t), and Q*(t), respectively.  Fixing the length of copyright protection at T, 
the total social surplus derived from the monopolist’s product, given the project is undertaken, is 
given by the expression in (2). 
                                                     
6 There would be no change in results if price and ex-post investment level for each period t were chosen at date t. 
 
7 A Hamiltonian approach yields the same results since the solution is interior. 
 
8 To simplify the analysis, we assume that ex-post investments themselves cannot be copyrighted.  In the real world 
ex-post investments can sometimes be copyrighted if the work is “substantially altered.”  Allowing for this 
possibility would not substantially change the qualitative nature of our results since, in the absence of copyright 
protection for the original work, even with some copyright protection for ex-post investments there would still be 
ex-post underinvestment due to free riding.  A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Landes and Posner 
(2003).  Also, see the Conclusion for a related discussion. 
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The regulator’s problem is to choose the length of copyright protection, T, in order to maximize 
total surplus.  In the analysis that follows, we solve the model explicitly given linear demand, 
f(x)=x/2, and cost functions g(h)=hk, k>1, and c(i)=i2. 
 
B) Some Preliminary Results 
 We begin by considering the monopolist’s problem given a fixed and finite copyright 
length.  Suppose the project is undertaken with an initial investment level of h.  The 
monopolist’s problem is then given by equation (3). 
∫ −−−= T rttitP dtetitPtQ tPQV 0
2
)(),(
]))(()()
)(
)(1(2[max))0((  
s.t. )()()(' titQtQ γδ +−=      (3) 
       0)0( >Q  given, 0)( =Ti  
Since (1-(P(t)/Q(t)))P(t) is maximized when P(t)=Q(t)/2, we have that (3) reduces to (4).   
dtetQtQtQ rt
T
tQ
−∫ +−
0
2
2)(
)))()('(1)(
2
1(max δγ  
0)0( >Q  given, 0)()(' =+ TQTQ δ     (4) 
The Euler equation for this problem is Q′′(t)-rQ′(t)-δ(δ+r)Q(t)=-γ2/4, where the general solution 
to this equation takes the form Q*(t)=A1e-δt+A2e(δ+r)t+A3.  The values for A1, A2, and A3 are 
determined by substituting the appropriate boundary conditions which yields A1=Q(0)+(γ2/4δ(δ 
+r))((δ/2δ+r))(e-(δ+r)T-1), A2=-((γ2/4(δ+r)(2δ+r))e-(δ+r)T, and A3=γ2/4δ(δ+r).   
 This analysis can be used to show that, if the monopolist decides to undertake the project, 
then the firm’s optimal decisions exhibit several intuitive properties.  First, the longer is the 
length of copyright protection, the higher is the monopolist’s benefits from ex-post investments.  
Thus, increasing the length of copyright protection increases ex-post investment levels, i.e., 
∂i*(t)/∂T≥0 for all t<T.  Second, ex-post investment levels as a function of copyright length rise 
at a falling rate, i.e., ∂2i*(t)/∂T2≤0 for all t<T.  There are two reasons for this.  One is that the 
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cost function for ex-post investments is convex.  The other is that, because of discounting, 
monopoly benefits as a function of T rise at a falling rate. 
 Now consider the dynamics of the optimal ex-post investment levels.  As the expiration 
of copyright protection gets closer, the level of ex-post investment declines, i.e., ∂i*(t)/∂t≤0, 
because the benefits from investment are derived for a shorter period of time.  Moreover, ex-post 
investment levels decrease at an increasing rate, i.e., ∂2i*(t)/∂t2≤0.  This follows from the same 
logic as why investment levels as a function of copyright length rise at a falling rate.  That is, the 
driving forces here are again the convexity of the ex-post investment cost function and the fact 
that discounting means that monopoly benefits from ex-post investment fall more quickly with a 
decrease in the length of copyright protection when the overall length is shorter.  The optimal 
path of ex-post investment levels as a function of t is presented in Figure 1.   
 We now turn to the monopolist’s initial decisions concerning whether or not to undertake 
the project and, if it decides to undertake the project, its choice of an initial investment level.  
We start with the latter decision.  If the project is undertaken, then the maximization problem it 
faces in choosing h is given by equation (5). 
zhhV k
h
−−)(max α       (5) 
This yields the first-order condition given in equation (6). 
αδ
ααα δ )0(*)
)(2
)1(())('(* 1
1)(
1
1 Q
rk
e
k
hVh k
Tr
k =+
−== −
+−
−    (6) 
 Now consider the monopolist’s decision concerning whether or not to undertake the 
project, i.e., the monopolist should undertake the project if the maximized value of V(Q(0))-hk-z 
is positive.  Since the maximized value of V(Q(0))-hk is independent of z, holding all other 
parameters fixed there exists a critical value for z, call it z+, such that the project is undertaken if 
z<z+ and is not undertaken if z>z+.  Further, given that we know from earlier that for any fixed h 
the maximized value of V(Q(0)) is increasing in T, z+ itself must be increasing in T, i.e., 
increasing the length of copyright protection makes undertaking projects more attractive and thus 
the project is undertaken under a wider range of parameterizations. 
 The last preliminary result concerning finite copyright protection is the derivation of total 
social surplus, denoted W(T).  Given from earlier we know that optimal pricing when copyright 
protection is in place sets P(t)=Q(t)/2, we have that equation (2) reduces to (7).   
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Further, substituting into (7) our earlier derived expression for Q*(t) yields (8). 
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 We now consider what happens when copyright protection is infinite.  As before, suppose 
the project is undertaken with an initial investment of h.  The monopolist’s problem is then given 
by equation (9). 
dtetQtQtQ rt
tQ
−
∞∫ +−
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2)(
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2
1(max δγ  
0)0( >Q  given       (9) 
The general solution to this equation again takes the form Q*(t)=A1e-δt+A2e(δ+r)t+A3, where the 
transversality condition and the initial quality level imply A1=Q(0)-(γ2/4δ(δ+r)), A2=0, and 
A3=γ2/4δ(δ+r).   
 Now consider the monopolist’s ex-post investment levels.  This is given by equation 
(10). 
)(4
)(*
2
r
ti += δ
γ       (10) 
Note that i*(t) is constant when copyright protection is infinite.  Figure 1 compares the dynamics 
of the monopolist’s optimal ex-post investment levels when copyright protection is finite and 
infinite.  The optimal ex-post investment path for infinitely-lived copyright protection is always 
above the optimal ex-post investment path for finite protection because the benefits from ex-post 
investments are received longer under infinite copyright. 
 Substituting the expression for i*(t) into the equation for Q*(t) yields that with infinite 
copyright protection Q*(t) approaches γ2/4δ(δ+r) asymptotically.  In words, since the ex-post 
investment level is constant under infinite-copyright protection, in the limit quality approaches 
the quality level that is just sustainable given the constant ex-post investment level.  Holding all 
other parameters fixed, there exists a critical value for the return on initial investment, call it α′, 
that defines three possible quality paths.  First, if α>α′, then Q*(t) decreases over time and 
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approaches γ2/4δ(δ+r) from above.  Second, if α<α′, then Q*(t) increases over time and 
approaches γ2/4δ(δ+r) from below.  Third, if α=α′, then Q*(t) is constant and equal to γ2/4δ(δ+r). 
 Now consider the monopolist’s decision to undertake the project.  As in the finite case, 
there exists a critical value for z, call it z+(∞), such that the project is undertaken when z<z+(∞) and 
is not undertaken when z>z+(∞).  Further, z+ in the finite case approaches z+(∞) as T gets large. 
 Finally, since optimal pricing still satisfies P(t)=Q(t)/2, total social surplus in the infinite-
copyright-protection case is derived by setting T=∞ in equation (7). 
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2
2
)(8
*)(
)(4
)0(*3)(
rr
zh
r
QW k ++−−+=∞ δ
γ
δ      (12) 
 
IV. THE OPTIMALITY OF INFINITELY-LIVED COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
 In this section we investigate the conditions in which infinitely-lived copyright protection 
is optimal.  We start by considering this question for the case of a single product (or multiple 
identical products), and then consider the issue given multiple heterogeneous products.  We then 
employ our analysis to consider the optimality of the CTEA. 
 
A) Single Product 
 The standard argument in favor of longer copyright protection concerns the supply of 
initial works.  This argument is simply that longer copyright protection increases the aggregate 
number of works created.  In our model, there are two ways in which infinitely-lived copyright 
protection might enhance social welfare.  First, consistent with the standard argument, infinitely-
lived copyright protection increases the number of works created.  Second, infinitely-lived 
copyright protection improves social welfare by encouraging higher levels of initial and ex-post 
investments for any given work.  On the other hand, infinitely-lived copyright protection can 
decrease social welfare if the welfare loss from increased monopoly underutilization exceeds 
these benefits. 
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 As indicated, we begin by considering a single product.  In considering social surplus as 
a function of copyright length, it is easy to derive examples in which infinitely-lived copyright 
length is preferred to any finitely-lived copyright.  Proposition 1 given below extends this point 
and shows that when ex-post investments are possible, for any parameterization of the discount 
rate, depreciation rate, initial cost, and return on ex-post investments, infinitely-lived copyright 
protection will be optimal when the return on the initial investment is sufficiently low.  Note, all 
proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1: Holding all other parameters fixed and given γ>0, there exists a value α-, α->0, 
such that infinitely-lived copyright protection is optimal when 0<α<α-.9 
 
 To understand the intuition behind Proposition 1, fix the initial quality level and consider 
what happens as copyright protection is increased from any arbitrary finite length to an infinite 
length.  On the one hand, there is a welfare gain because of increased ex-post investments, but, 
on the other hand, there is a welfare loss from increased underutilization of the product.  When 
the initial quality level is low, the incremental welfare loss from underutilization is low as well 
and a regulator will prefer infinitely-lived copyright protection.  As the initial quality level 
increases, underutilization losses also increase, making infinitely-lived copyright protection less 
attractive.  This implies a critical value for the initial quality level beyond which finitely-lived 
copyright protection is optimal.  Since the initial quality level is an increasing function of α, 
there is a critical value for the return on the initial investment as well.  Note that an additional 
factor is how the social-welfare loss from underproduction changes with copyright length.  
Because the decrease in the underproduction loss in moving from any finite copyright length to 
an infinite length is decreasing in α, incorporating this factor into the argument does not change 
the basic logic. 
 Proposition 1 focuses on the role of the return on the initial quality investment.  We now 
consider the role of ex-post investment returns. 
 
                                                     
9 Infinitely-lived copyright protection will be the unique optimal copyright policy for all α, 0<α<α-, if z is 
sufficiently small. 
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Proposition 2: Holding all other parameters fixed, there exists a value γ+, γ+>0, such that 
infinitely-lived copyright protection is the unique optimal policy when γ>γ+. 
 
 Proposition 2 states that a regulator will prefer infinitely-lived copyright protection when 
the return on ex-post investments is high enough.  The intuition here is that the welfare loss due 
to ex-post underproduction is higher when the return on ex-post investments is higher.  Thus, 
infinitely-lived copyright protection is optimal when the return on ex-post investments is 
sufficiently high because then the return in terms of a lower underproduction loss exceeds the 
cost of a higher underutilization loss.  Propositions 1 and 2 are simply two different ways of 
looking at the same result.  Both propositions follow from the idea that when deciding the 
duration of copyright protection, the return on ex-post investments relative to the return on initial 
investments is crucial.  That is, it is when the return on ex-post investments is relatively higher, 
i.e., the return on initial investment is sufficiently low (holding the ex-post investment return 
fixed) or the return on ex-post investments is sufficiently high (holding the initial investment 
return fixed), that infinitely-lived copyright protection is optimal.    
 
B) Multiple Heterogeneous Products 
 Propositions 1 and 2 show that there are always some works that benefit society more if 
the length of copyright protection is infinite.  However, works that fall into this category 
represent a subset of all works.  There are also many works for which the optimal length of 
copyright protection is finite.  In most situations, the regulator does not know ex-ante the 
specific characteristics of each individual work and thus is not able to tailor copyright protection 
to the idiosyncratic characteristics of a specific work.  With this in mind, what follows is an 
analysis of a regulator’s choice of copyright protection when the regulator assigns a single 
copyright protection length to a set of heterogeneous works. 
 To calculate the optimal length of copyright protection in such a setting, we first derive 
expressions for expected total surplus given any arbitrary copyright protection length imposed on 
a set of heterogeneous projects.  Let L(α,γ,T) be an indicator function that takes on a value of 
one (zero) if a monopolist with realizations for returns on his project given by α and γ and 
subject to copyright length T undertakes (does not undertake) the project.  Also, let W(α,γ,T) be 
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the realized societal total surplus as a function of α, γ, and T.  Let all firms draw the returns on 
their projects from the distribution F(α,γ), where α takes on values in the interval [αL,αH] and γ 
takes on values [γL,γH].  Expected societal total surplus, denoted E[W(T)], is given by equation 
(13). 
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 The calculation of optimal copyright length involves taking the derivative of E[W(T)] 
with respect to T.  Since the model is complicated, we first simulate the model for different sets 
of parameter values.  For these simulations, we assume that α and γ are drawn from independent 
distributions.  α is assumed to be distributed according to a uniform distribution on [αL,αH], and γ 
is assumed to take on values 0 and γ* with probabilities 1-φ and φ, respectively.  In words, the 
last assumption simply means that there is a set of works for which ex-post investments are not a 
factor and a set of works for which quality can be improved via ex-post investments, where all 
the works in the latter group have the same ex-post investment returns.  To be conservative 
concerning the importance of ex-post investments, we assume that the proportion of works for 
which ex-post investments are a factor is no greater than one percent.  The specific 
parameterizations we discuss are given in Table 1 and the simulation results for these 
parameterizations are presented in Figure 2.10  The horizontal axis in Figure 2 denotes the length 
of copyright protection while the vertical axis denotes normalized expected surplus.  By 
normalized here we mean that expected surplus in the figure is presented as a percent of 
expected surplus given copyright length is set at its optimal value. 
 Our simulations hold everything constant except γ and φ, i.e., the focus is on the 
proportion of projects with positive ex-post investment returns and the relative return on ex-post 
investments when they are positive.  The simulations show that infinitely-lived copyright 
protection is optimal for parameterizations C and D – the parameterizations in which a positive 
proportion of works have positive ex-post investment returns and these returns are relatively 
high (as in the previous subsection, relatively high here means that the return on ex-post 
investments is high relative to the return on the initial investment).  For parameterizations A and 
                                                     
10 We have considered a much larger number of parameterizations and the simulations reported are representative 
of our findings. 
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B, in which, respectively, there are no works with positive ex-post investment returns and the 
works with positive ex-post investment returns have relatively low ex-post returns, finitely-lived 
copyright protection is optimal.   
 Consider expected total surplus as the length of copyright protection increases when all 
ex-post investment returns are zero, as in parameterization A.  When the length of copyright 
protection is close to zero, most projects are rejected and the projects that are undertaken have 
very low initial quality levels.  Therefore, expected total surplus is close to zero.  As the length 
of copyright protection starts to increase, the number and quality of works created both increase 
rapidly.  This, in turn, increases expected total surplus.  After a point, however, expected surplus 
falls as the length of copyright protection increases further.  In words, in the absence of positive 
ex-post investment returns, the welfare loss from monopoly underutilization eventually rises 
faster than the welfare gain from more and higher quality works being created.  Part of the 
reasoning here is that increases in T increase the probability that a project is undertaken and 
increase the initial quality of the projects being undertaken, but the rates of increase both fall 
with T.  In the limit, as T approaches ∞, expected total surplus approaches some asymptotic 
value, since the effect of periods that are far in the future relative to the date of creation have a 
negligible effect on aggregate initial investment returns.  This analysis suggests that expected 
total surplus in the absence of positive ex-post investment returns typically has a single-peaked 
shape like that depicted for parameterization A. 
 Next, consider a parameterization for which ex-post investment returns are a factor.  
Then, our analysis suggests expected total surplus has two possible shapes.  The first is captured 
by the simulation of parameterization D.  For this parameterization, those projects characterized 
by positive ex-post investment returns have high relative ex-post investment returns on average.  
The result is that expected total surplus increases monotonically with T.  The second possible 
shape is captured by the simulations for parameterizations B and C.  For these simulations, the 
shape of the expected total surplus curve is somewhere between the shapes of the simulations for 
parameterizations A and D.  For low levels of T, expected total surplus first increases and then 
decreases similar to what was true for parameterization A.  The logic here is that for low levels 
of T the shape of the curve is mostly driven by projects with zero ex-post investment returns.  In 
contrast, for higher levels of T, expected total surplus increases monotonically similar to what 
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was true for parameterization D.  The logic here is that the behavior of expected total surplus for 
higher levels of T is driven mostly by projects with positive ex-post investment returns. 
 Employing a strictly analytic approach, we can derive a sufficient condition for the 
optimality of infinitely-lived copyright protection with heterogeneous products that is similar to 
the conditions found in Propositions 1 and 2 for a single product.  Suppose z=0 and denote the 
expectations of γ2 and αk/(k-1) by E[γ2] and E[αk/(k-1)], i.e., E[γ2]= γαγαγγγ
α
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lived copyright protection is given by equation (14). 
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 The derivation of equation (14) is given in the Appendix.  Similar to the intuition given 
for Propositions 1 and 2, the basic logic here is that the underutilization loss from copyright 
protection increases with higher initial quality levels.  Thus, infinitely-lived copyright protection 
will be optimal when returns on initial investments in quality are lower, i.e., when the 
denominator of the left-hand side of (14) is lower.  On the other hand, the welfare loss from ex-
post underproduction due to any arbitrary finite-copyright-protection length increases as the 
returns from ex-post investment increase.  Thus, if the returns on ex-post investment are high 
enough, i.e., the numerator of the left-hand side of (14) is high enough, infinitely-lived copyright 
protection will be optimal.  The policy implications of these results are discussed in the next 
subsection.   
 
C) Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 and Ex-Post Investments 
 In 1998, the U.S. Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.  The 
act has two major provisions: a lengthening of copyright protection for newly created works and 
the retroactive application of these new copyright terms to works that were produced before the 
act but for which copyright protection has not already expired.  Specifically, CTEA extends 
copyright protection from fifty years after the author’s death to seventy years after death for 
works produced by individuals.  For works for hire, copyright protection was increased from 
seventy-five years from publication (or one-hundred years from creation, whichever is shorter) 
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to ninety-five years from publication (or one-hundred and twenty years from creation, whichever 
is shorter).  We study the implications of ex-post investments with respect to CTEA separately 
for works created after the act and for works that were already in place when the act was passed. 
 First, consider the effects of the CTEA on the total surplus associated with works 
produced after the act.  Critics of the act argue that the impact on social welfare for new works is 
negative.  Our interpretation is that the critics have in mind an analysis very similar to what 
happens in our model when there are no ex-post investments.  Consider Figure 3 which 
reproduces three of the simulations from Figure 2.11  Our interpretation is that the critics are 
implicitly assuming that the true expected total surplus curve looks like the single-peaked curve 
for parameterization A, and that they further assume copyright length before CTEA was at a 
value like Tbefore greater than Tpeak and thus social welfare fell when copyright length was 
extended due to CTEA to Tafter.  However, given this interpretation, the extension did not reduce 
the total surplus associated with new works by much since total surplus was close to its 
asymptotic value before the act.  In words, increasing copyright length increased the 
underutilization loss, but because of discounting and the fact that copyright length was already 
high there was only a small reduction of total surplus. 
 But that argument ignores ex-post investments.  Two possibilities for what can happen 
when ex-post investments are possible are also pictured in Figure 3.  Contrary to the no ex-post 
investment case just discussed, for each of the two parameterizations associated with a positive 
proportion of positive ex-post investments projects total surplus increases when copyright length 
is increased from Tbefore  to Tafter.  However, because of discounting and that copyright length was 
already long before the act, for each parameterization the increase is small because prior to the 
act total surplus was close to its asymptotic value.  Note, however, although CTEA does increase 
total surplus somewhat, it is not necessarily optimal.  For parameterization B for which returns 
on ex-post investments are relatively small, the regulator’s best policy is to decrease copyright 
length to Tpeak rather than increase it to Tafter.  However, for parameterization C for which returns 
on ex-post investments are relatively large, the regulator’s best policy is to implement infinitely-
lived copyright protection. 
                                                     
11 We do not report simulation results for parameterization D since from a qualitative standpoint they are the same 
as for parameterization C. 
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 Next, consider the implications of the CTEA on existing works, i.e., the implications of 
retroactive copyright extension on works that were created before the act but for which copyright 
protection had not yet expired.12  Figure 4 considers the same three parameterizations considered 
in Figure 3, but now the exercise is what happens to the surplus associated with existing works 
when copyright protection is retroactively extended.  When ex-post investments are not a factor, 
there is no welfare gain from retroactive copyright extension since the supply of works is 
unaffected.  However, there is a welfare loss due to monopoly underutilization.  Thus, as 
captured by the total surplus curve for parameterization A in Figure 4, a retroactive copyright 
extension is welfare reducing for existing works in the absence of ex-post investments. 
 Now consider retroactive copyright extension when there are positive ex-post investment 
returns for some existing works.  There are two possibilities for what happens to the total surplus 
associated with existing works, where these two possibilities are captured by the curves for 
parameterizations B and C in Figure 4.  When ex-post investment returns are relatively small as 
is the case for parameterization B, the increased underutilization loss dominates the decreased 
underproduction loss with the result that total surplus due to existing works falls with retroactive 
copyright extension.  However, when ex-post investment returns are relatively large as is the 
case for parameterization C, then the increased underutilization loss is dominated by the 
decreased underproduction loss with the result that total surplus due to existing works increases 
with retroactive copyright extension. 
 In summary, our analysis does not show that CTEA necessarily either increased or 
decreased aggregate total surplus.  Our analysis shows that it is possible that the critics of the act 
were correct, i.e., the act lowered total surplus.  But our analysis also shows that this is not 
necessarily the case.  If ex-post investments, i.e., a factor that the critics completely ignored, 
were sufficiently important, then CTEA could have increased total surplus both because of 
                                                     
12 Note that for these works, the monopolist has already undertaken the initial investment and current quality levels 
are known.  Therefore, we simulate the model by considering the distribution of current quality levels implied by 
the distribution of initial investment returns assuming the passage of the act itself was unanticipated.  We calculate 
the current quality level of an existing work for each realization of α and γ by keeping track of ex-post investments 
and quality depreciation.  Then, expected total surplus levels associated with various lengths of retroactive 
copyright extension are calculated by taking into account that the monopolist’s future ex-post investments in each 
work reflect this policy change.   
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increased surplus associated with new works and increased surplus associated with already 
existing works.   
V. INDEFINITELY-RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
 In the real world intellectual works are heterogeneous and the length of optimal copyright 
protection will vary with the characteristics of each individual work.  Under current copyright 
policy, however, the duration of actual copyright protection is the same for all works.  The 
government grants the same length of copyright protection for all works because of the 
prohibitive costs associated with evaluating each project individually and assigning a copyright 
length based on the work’s specific characteristics.  These ideas introduce the possibility of a 
“second best” alternative policy that improves upon the current system’s fixed copyright length 
that does not vary across works.  In this section we explore one such possible alternative policy. 
 Landes and Posner (2003) argue that “indefinitely-renewable copyright” can potentially 
improve upon the current policy of fixed copyright length.  Indefinitely-renewable copyright 
refers to a policy wherein copyright protection can be renewed indefinitely through periodic 
payments made by the work’s creator.  Under such a policy, on the other hand, if the periodic 
payments are discontinued then the work enters the public domain.  In the analysis that follows, 
we extend our model to study whether indefinitely-renewable copyright can result in welfare 
higher than that associated with the best fixed-length copyright protection.  As we will show, the 
answer is a qualified yes.  That is, depending on the nature of the distribution of initial 
investment and ex-post investment returns in the economy, moving to an indefinitely-renewable 
copyright policy may improve welfare but is not guaranteed to do so in all cases.13 
 Denote by ω the instantaneous renewal fee a monopolist pays to extend copyright 
protection.  Under an indefinitely-renewable copyright policy, the monopolist decides the length 
of copyright protection.  More specifically, the monopolist first decides whether or not to 
undertake the project and, if the project is undertaken, the firm then decides how long to pay the 
fee, i.e., the length of copyright protection, and initial and ex-post investment levels.  To get 
some intuition for how the model works under indefinitely-renewable copyright protection, 
                                                     
13 Yuan (2005) provides an analysis in which the optimal fixed-length copyright policy dominates indefinitely-
renewable copyright, but his analysis ignores ex-post investments. 
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consider the monopolist’s optimal behavior given this policy when a project is undertaken.  The 
monopolist’s optimization problem in this case is given by (15).  
k
T
rt
htQT
hdtetQtQtQ −−+−∫ −∞∈
0
2
2),(),,0[
)))()('(1)(
2
1(max ωδγ  
s.t. hQ α=)0(       (15) 
Equation (15) can be rewritten as (16). 
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 From (16), we see that the level of renewal fees affects the monopolist’s initial and ex-
post investment levels only indirectly, via the duration of copyright protection.  That is, taking as 
fixed the monopolist’s choice of copyright duration, varying the fee does not affect investment 
levels and prices since the fee is a fixed cost from the monopolist’s perspective.14  Moving one 
step back, the monopolist undertakes the project if the net revenue from undertaking the project 
exceeds the initial cost of the project.  That is, letting T* denote the monopolist’s choice of 
optimal copyright length given the project is undertaken, the monopolist undertakes the project 
when (17) is satisfied. 
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 We now compare social welfare under fixed-term copyright protection and indefinitely-
renewable copyright protection.  We start by considering this comparison when projects are 
homogeneous.  The following proposition shows that in this case indefinitely-renewable 
copyright never improves upon the optimal fixed-term copyright length and sometimes adopting 
the policy strictly reduces welfare.  Note, below let WF(T) denote social welfare given a fixed 
copyright length of T, while WR(ω) denotes social welfare given indefinitely-renewable 
copyright protection where the instantaneous fee is set at ω.15 
 
                                                     
14 The argument that a renewal fee should be treated as a fixed cost can also be found in Rappaport (2002).  In his 
analysis, however, the monopolist pays a single upfront fee to extend copyright protection for a discrete amount of 
time rather than the monopolist facing the instantaneous fee that we consider. 
 
15 In our calculation of WR(ω), fees collected by the government are distributed to consumers on an equal-share 
basis.  As long as we assume a large number of firms, we could equivalently assume that the fees are returned to 
firms on an equal-share basis.  
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Proposition 3: Assuming projects are homogeneous and holding all other parameters fixed, there 
always exists a value T+ such that WF(T+)≥WR(ω) for all ω, ω≥0, where for some 
parameterizations this inequality is strict. 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows.  When there is a single project or 
multiple homogeneous projects, the renewal fee affects investment levels only by affecting the 
monopolist’s choice of a copyright length.  Thus, social welfare under any indefinitely-
renewable copyright policy can be matched with a fixed-term policy by setting the fixed length 
equal to the monopolist’s choice of copyright length under the indefinitely-renewable policy.  In 
addition, the absence of a renewal fee in the fixed-length case makes undertaking the initial 
project more attractive from the monopolist’s perspective with the result that social welfare is 
sometimes higher with the optimal fixed-term copyright length than with indefinitely-renewable 
copyright and the optimal fee. 
 To more clearly see why fixed-length copyright protection can be strictly superior in the 
homogeneous product case, consider the following example.  Consider an economy with a single 
project, where α=1, γ=0, k=3, δ=0.08, r=0.08, and z=0.25.  Note that since γ=0 the monopolist 
does not make positive ex-post investments in this example.  Consider first the regulator’s 
optimal choice of a fixed copyright length.  Optimal length can be calculated by maximizing 
social welfare given by equation (8).  This calculation yields that the optimal copyright length 
for this project is 10.1 periods.  In turn, substituting this into the relevant expressions yields 
monopoly profit equals 0.044 and total social surplus equals 3.804.  Now consider indefinitely-
renewable copyright.  The optimal fee for this example is 0.013 which yields a copyright length 
of 25.2 periods.  Monopoly profit now equals 0.008 and total social surplus is 3.735 which is less 
than total surplus given the best fixed-length copyright policy. 
 This example illustrates why fixed-length copyright protection can be superior.  Under a 
renewable copyright policy, there is no instantaneous fee that results in the monopolist holding 
the copyright for exactly 10.1 periods.  The first-order condition for monopoly choice of a 
copyright length yields that achieving this result requires the regulator to charge a renewal fee of 
0.039, but this yields monopoly profit of -0.227.  Thus, faced with this renewal fee the 
monopolist would not undertake the project, so total social surplus would be zero.  Further, 
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under any renewal fee below ω=0.039 that yields non-negative monopoly profits the monopolist 
holds the copyright longer than 10.1 periods.  So, as indicated, social welfare under indefinitely-
renewable copyright and the best renewal fee is below social welfare given the best fixed-length 
copyright policy.16    
 We now consider what happens when products are heterogenous rather than 
homogeneous.  Here we assume a specification similar to the specification in the simulation 
analysis of heterogenous projects in Section IV.  α and γ are independently distributed in the 
population.  Specifically, α is distributed according to a uniform distribution on [αL,αH], while 
γ=γ*, γ*>0, with probability φ and γ=0 with probability (1-φ), where we now assume 0<φ<1.  
Also, let ω* be the optimal instantaneous fee given indefinitely-renewable copyright protection. 
 
Proposition 4: Holding all other parameters fixed, there exists a value γ′, γ′>0, such that  
WR(ω*)≥WF(T) for all T, T≥0, if γ*>γ′ (where WR(ω*)>WF(T) for all T, T≥0, if γ*>γ′ and in 
addition k>2 and αL is not too small). 
 
 Proposition 4 states that indefinitely-renewable copyright protection will be optimal as 
long as ex-post investment returns are sufficiently high.  The logic here is as follows.  With 
indefinitely-renewable copyright protection, as opposed to fixed-length copyright protection, the 
length of copyright protection is the endogenous choice of each work’s creator (or whoever the 
creator assigns the right to).  So an important issue concerning whether indefinitely-renewable 
copyright improves welfare is whether it results in efficient matches between endogenously 
chosen copyright lengths and optimal copyright lengths.  We know from earlier that optimal 
copyright length tends to be long, possibly infinite, when relative ex-post returns are high.  So 
indefinitely-renewable copyright protection is likely to be efficient when it results in periodic 
renewals for works with high relative ex-post returns and quick termination of payments for 
works with low relative ex-post returns. 
                                                     
16 In our analysis the renewal fee is a constant rather than a function of how long the copyright has been held.  If we 
allowed the renewal fee to vary with current copyright duration, then in the homogeneous-product case indefinitely-
renewable copyright and the best renewal-fee function would always yield the same social surplus as the best fixed-
length copyright policy. 
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 Given this, consider what happens in our model when γ* gets large.  Then basically there 
are two types of projects – those with low or in our specification zero relative ex-post returns and 
those with high relative ex-post returns.  By setting a moderate fee the government is frequently 
able to achieve an endogenous choice of copyright lengths that dominates any arbitrary fixed- 
length copyright policy.  The reason is that firms whose projects are characterized by γ=γ* 
continually pay the fee which is optimal given the high relative ex-post returns, while those 
characterized by γ=0 stop paying the fee after a relatively short time period which is optimal 
given the low relative ex-post returns.  Hence, when γ* is large implementing indefinitely-
renewable copyright protection frequently improves welfare in our model.17 
 We can now summarize the conditions in which our analysis indicates that the adoption 
of an indefinitely-renewable copyright policy is likely to be welfare improving.  The first 
condition is that intellectual works are sufficiently heterogeneous that a fixed single copyright 
length results in an outcome far from the first best.  The second is that for the projects with 
positive ex-post returns these returns are sufficiently high.  When this is the case indefinitely-
renewable copyright is optimal because the works that are continuously renewed are exactly the 
set of works for which very long copyright protection is optimal.  Or, in other words, as 
indicated above, Landes and Posner’s claim that the adoption of indefinitely-renewable 
copyright can improve welfare is correct but it is not guaranteed to do so in all cases. 
 
VI. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MICKEY MOUSE 
 In this section we briefly discuss the history of Disney’s Mickey Mouse.  The CTEA was 
passed just before copyright protection for Mickey Mouse was scheduled to expire and the  
passage of the act significantly extended copyright protection for the character.  We believe the 
history of the character both before and after passage of the act supports our argument that very 
                                                     
17 The role of the conditions k>2 and αL not too small is that they ensure that as γ* gets large the optimal 
instantaneous fee is strictly positive.  That is, without these conditions it is possible that as γ* gets large the optimal 
fixed copyright length is ∞ and the optimal instantaneous fee equals zero.  Clearly when this is the case the optimal 
fixed copyright length and the optimal instantaneous fee yield the same value for social welfare. 
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long copyright protection, or more precisely in this case retroactive copyright protection, can 
significantly increase ex-post investments in a copyrighted product.18 
 Mickey Mouse was created in 1928 by Walt Disney and Ub Iwerks who was the chief 
animator at Disney Studios.  Mickey first appeared in a series of cartoons including Steamboat 
Willie which was one of the early cartoons to feature a sound track.  These cartoons were 
typically shown in movie theaters prior to the main feature.  After the release of Steamboat 
Willie the Mickey Mouse character quickly achieved broad popularity and over the next few 
years numerous cartoons were produced and the character also appeared in comic strips and 
eventually comic books.  The quick success of the character, in fact, led to an Oscar presented to 
Walt Disney in 1932 for the original creation of the character. 
 Over the next few decades the character continued to be popular in various ways.  He 
appeared in various cartoons and movies including The Sorcerer’s Apprentice segment in 
Disney’s classic Fantasia.  With the growth of television in the 1950s Mickey jumped into the 
new medium.  The original Mickey Mouse Club was introduced in 1955 and became the most 
popular children’s show on television, and this was followed by later versions of the show 
introduced in 1977 and 1989.  Mickey has also had an important role in the various theme parks 
and resorts that Disney has opened around the world, including various “lands” focused on the 
character. 
 But by the mid 1990s Mickey had become a much less important part of Disney’s 
entertainment offerings.  Although he still had an important role in a number of the company’s 
theme parks and as a corporate symbol for the company, his use and popularity in terms of 
children’s entertainment had clearly waned.  His film appearances were few and he had little 
presence in the numerous children’s television programs produced by Disney that appeared on 
the Disney channel and elsewhere.  In terms of television programs and other children’s 
entertainment Disney relied almost exclusively on various other characters most of which were 
created and therefore copyrighted long after Mickey’s introduction in 1928. 
 But this situation has changed in the last few years as Disney has announced a number of 
efforts to revive the character.  The results of Disney’s efforts include various cartoon shows 
                                                     
18 Histories of Mickey Mouse can be found in Hollis and Sibley (1986) and Heide et al. (2001).  Also, for a more 
recent discussion see Stanley (2006). 
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including Mickey Mouse Works which appeared in 1999-2000, Disney’s House of Mouse which 
played from 2001 to 2003, and Mickey Mouse Clubhouse which was introduced in 2006.  Also, 
in 2004 two Mickey Mouse made-for-video features were released – The Three Musketeers and 
Mickey’s Twice Upon a Christmas.  More generally it is clear that Disney has decided to expend 
resources in various ways to increase the character’s popularity including making the television 
shows and movies mentioned above and promoting Mickey in various other ways such as having 
Mickey be the Grand Marshal of the Tournament of Roses Parade on New Year’s Day of 2005. 
 The other interesting aspect from our perspective of Mickey Mouse’s history is how 
much the nature of the character and how the character has been used have changed over time.  
Mickey started out as a somewhat mischievous and roguish character.  Over time, however, as he 
became an important corporate symbol for Disney, Mickey’s personality became less colorful 
and many of the more comedic aspects of the films and comics were given to Mickey’s best 
friends Goofy and Donald Duck.  It is also the case that although the animation films were 
mostly focused on comedy, the comic strip combined comedy with adventure.  Finally, in 
Mickey’s most recent incarnation in the 2006 children’s television program, Mickey Mouse 
Clubhouse, the program has a more educational format like Sesame Street and Mickey’s 
character can best be described as similar to the classic children’s entertainer Mr. Rogers. 
 From our standpoint, what is most interesting about this history is how well it matches 
the predictions of our theory.  Clearly the Mickey Mouse character is one for which ex-post 
investments have been very important.  Rather than the character staying static as one might 
expect given the standard theoretical framework for looking at copyright protection, the 
character has changed over time as circumstances and society itself have changed.  And just as is 
true for the creation of the original character, these changes were not free but required 
investments in the creative process that allowed Mickey to evolve in a fashion that has kept him 
popular for a very long period of time. 
 Further, how the commercial success of the character has varied over time is also 
consistent with our theoretical framework.  Our analysis predicts that, as the time of initial 
copyright expiration approached, Disney should have invested less in maintaining the character 
with a subsequent reduction in revenues and profits generated through the use of the character.  
In turn, after the copyright was extended in 1998, Disney should have increased investments 
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used to improve the popularity of the character with a corresponding increase in revenues and 
profits derived from the character.  And these predictions are consistent with exactly what 
happened.  Prior to 1998 the nature of the character became quite stagnant and profits derived 
from television shows and videos focused on the character became very small.  However, soon 
after the passage of the CTEA in 1998, Disney announced a “make-over” of the character with 
the result being significant changes in the nature of the character and dramatic increases in the 
commercial use of the character both in terms of television programs and videos. 
 Overall, we believe the history of Disney’s Mickey Mouse clearly supports the idea that 
ex-post investments can be important and that, when this is the case, very long copyright 
protection and even retroactive copyright protection can be useful for stimulating investments 
used to sustain the popularity of the character.  We believe it is hard to reconcile Mickey’s 
history with the traditional theory of copyright in which all investments are made up front and a 
work’s current commercial viability depends on how well those original investments are a match 
with current tastes.  Such a framework has trouble explaining Mickey’s loss in popularity and 
commercial use by the mid 1990s and quick resurgence after passage of the CTEA in 1998.  But 
these events are not at all difficult to explain with our theory that gives an important role to ex- 
post investments.19 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The standard approach for analyzing optimal copyright protection is to assume that all 
investments are incurred by the time the product is introduced.  But in reality there are many 
important cases, such as the example of Mickey Mouse and Disney, where significant quality-
enhancing investments are made long after the product is introduced.  This is important because 
the introduction of such ex-post investments qualitatively changes the potential benefits of very 
long-term or even infinitely-lived copyright protection.  In the absence of such investments, very 
long-term or infinitely-lived copyright protection makes little sense because discounting means 
                                                     
19 One difference between the Mickey Mouse example and our model is that, even in the absence of copyright 
protection, Disney retains some property rights concerning the character because of trademark protection.  
However, it seems quite plausible that those property rights are stronger when copyright protection is also in place, 
and thus that Disney’s incentive to make ex-post investments in Mickey Mouse should have risen with the passage 
of the CTEA. 
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that profits far off in the future have little effect on the incentives for the original creation of a 
product.  But if such investments are present, then there can be important benefits associated 
with very long-term copyright protection because of the incentives created for ex-post 
investments. 
 In this paper we formally analyzed this issue and found three main results.  First, 
consistent with the above discussion, the introduction of ex-post investments means that long-
term, possibly even, infinitely-lived copyright protection can be optimal.  In particular, this will 
be the case when the return on ex-post investments is sufficiently high relative to the return on 
initial investments.  Second, in contrast to the argument of Akerlof et al. (2002), the passage of 
the CTEA may have increased rather than decreased social welfare.  This will be the case when 
the projects with positive ex-post investment returns have sufficiently high returns because then 
extending the length of copyright protection helps social welfare associated with both existing 
works and newly-created works.  Third, we consider Landes and Posner’s (2003) idea of 
indefinitely-renewable copyright protection and show that it is likely to improve upon the best 
fixed-term copyright policy when again the returns on ex-post investments are sufficiently high. 
 There are a number of directions in which the paper’s analysis can be extended.  One set 
of directions concerns the issue of modeling strategy briefly mentioned in the Introduction.  That 
is, in this paper, partially in order to make our argument easy to follow, we intentionally 
abstracted away from a number of factors that can serve to limit the effects that the presence of 
ex-post investments can have on optimal copyright length.  Although we believe that 
incorporating these factors would not change the qualitative nature of the results, we believe it 
would be worthwhile investigating this issue formally.  There are three specific factors that we 
feel are worth investigating.  First, related to a brief discussion in the Introduction, we believe it 
is worth considering how results change when the free-rider problem after copyright expiration 
is less severe so that some ex-post investments are made even when there is no longer copyright 
protection.  Second, related to the discussion in footnote 8, in future work we plan to allow some 
copyright protection for ex-post investments themselves – specifically, when the investments 
significantly alter the nature of the product.  Third, we think it would be interesting to 
incorporate heterogeneous depreciation.  In particular, we think incorporating this feature could 
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be important for better understanding the circumstances in which indefinitely-renewable 
copyright protection is optimal.  
 The other direction for future research that we think is important is the empirical 
investigation of how significant ex-post investments are in real-world settings.  Clearly, such as 
in the case of Mickey Mouse, there are important real-world examples in which ex-post 
investment returns are present and large.  However, given the extent to which large ex-post 
investment returns are required for our main findings, the fact that they sometimes exist is 
suggestive but clearly what is important is how common they are and how large they are.  This is 
an empirical question and one that needs to be investigated to get an accurate sense of what 
optimal copyright policy looks like in real-world settings.    
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Take any δ, r, γ, k and z.  If the project is undertaken under a finite-
length copyright policy, the project will be undertaken under an infinite-length copyright policy 
as well.  Social welfare from finite-length and infinite-length copyright policies are given below.  
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Social surplus under an infinite-length copyright policy is greater than social surplus under any 
finite-length copyright policy if W(∞)≥W(T) for any T≥0.  Noting that h∞*> hT* and that 
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After substituting hT*, the optimality condition for an infinite-length copyright policy can be 
rewritten as (A4). 
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Noting that eδT-e-(δ+r)T≥0, eδT≥1 and (1/(1-e-(δ+r)T))1/(k-1)≥1, one can derive the following condition 
for the optimality of an infinite-length copyright policy. 
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Choose kkk rrrk /)1()1/(12 ))(6/())(2(( −−− ++= δδγα .  Since the left-hand-side of (A5) is strictly 
positive, social welfare under an infinite-length copyright policy is higher than social welfare 
under any finite-length copyright policy whenever α is in region (0,α-]. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Take any δ, r, α, k and z.  Consider ex-post investment return values 
such that γ≥4(δ+r)√(rz).  This condition guarantees that the project is undertaken when the length 
of copyright protection is infinite.  Following the proof of Proposition 1, a sufficient condition 
for the optimality of an infinite-length copyright policy can be rewritten as (A6). 
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Let γ+=max{4(δ+r)√(rz), [6αk/(k-1)r(δ+r)(2k(δ+r)1/(k-1)]1/2}.  Since the right-hand side of inequality 
(A6) is positive, an infinite-length copyright policy is preferred to any finite-length copyright 
policy whenever γ is in the region [γ+,∞).   
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  Take any α, z, δ, r, γ, k and ω≥0, and let TF be the copyright length 
under the fixed-length policy and TR the endogenously chosen length under the indefinitely-
renewable policy.  If the monopolist optimally decides not to undertake the project given the 
indefinitely-renewable policy, then social welfare under the indefinitely-renewable copyright 
policy is zero.  Therefore, under any choice of TF, the total surplus under fixed-length copyright 
is at least the level of total surplus under renewable copyright.  Suppose the monopolist 
undertakes the project and renews the copyright for TR periods under the renewable copyright 
policy.  Choose TF=TR.  Under a fixed-length copyright policy of TF periods, the monopolist’s 
ex-post investment and quality paths are the same under the two policies.  The monopolist’s 
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revenue from undertaking the project under the fixed-length copyright policy is at least the level 
of revenue from the renewable copyright policy since the monopolist does not have to pay the 
renewal fee.  Thus, the monopolist undertakes the project under the fixed-length copyright policy 
and social welfare is the same under the two policies.  Further, the example in the text proves 
that the inequality is sometimes strict.   
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  Fix all parameters except γ*.  First, we will show that WR(ω*)≥WF(T) 
for all T, T≥0, whenever γ*>γ+.  Let γ+ = ((6r(δ+r)αHk/(k-1))/(φ(2k(δ+r))1/(k-1)))1/2.  Under this 
condition, the monopolist chooses infinite copyright protection whenever γ*>γ+ because for each 
realization of α infinite copyright is preferred to finite length copyright.  Then, we can choose 
ω*=0 and the monopolist holds projects indefinitely both under fixed length and renewable 
copyright policies.  Thus, social welfare levels are the same if ω*=0 whenever γ*>γ+.  
 Next, let k>2 and αL > k(k+2)(δ+r)[z/(k−1)](k-1)/k/2.  Let a renewal fee equal ω* = min 
{ω1,ω2}, where ω1 = [4(αL/2)k/(k(δ+r)(k+2))k]1/(k-1)(k−2)/2 and ω2 = r(k −1) [2αL /(k(δ + r)(k + 
2))]k/(k-1)/2 − rz/2.  Take any γ1 such that the monopolist with α=αL decides to hold the 
renewable copyright forever when the monopolist’s ex-post investment return is γ1 and the 
renewal fee is ω*.  We will show that indefinitely-renewable copyright is strictly preferred to 
fixed-term copyright when γ*>γ+, where 
γ+= }))))(2(/())(6((,max{ 2/1)1/(1)1/(1 −− ++ kkkH rkrr δϕαδγ .   
 Take any γ* > γ+.  Under a fixed-term copyright, the regulator sets an infinite copyright 
term because expected return on ex-post investments is high enough.  Consider the projects with 
positive ex-post investment returns.  Under indefinitely renewable copyright, the monopolist 
with positive ex-post returns holds the project forever as well because γ* > γ1.  Thus, the levels 
of social welfare for works with positive ex-post investment returns are the same under both 
copyright systems.  Now take any project with the initial investment return of α and with zero 
ex-post investment returns.  From equation (8), socially optimal copyright term for this project is 
T* = [ln((k+2)/(k-2))]/(δ+r) periods.  Furthermore, equation (8) implies that social welfare for 
this project is strictly decreasing from T* on, i.e., W(T*)>W(T1)>W(T2)>W(∞) for T*<T1<T2.  
Under indefinitely renewable copyright, the monopolist would hold the copyright for T(α) 
periods, where T(α) is derived from equation (16) by equating the marginal revenue from 
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holding the project an extra period to the marginal cost of holding the project for an extra period.  
In other words, T(α) satisfies MR(T) = MC(T) such that MR(T+)<MC(T+) for T+ >T(α),  where 
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copyright duration T(α) is unique under the renewal fee ω*.  Note that T* < T(α) < ∞ since  
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Also that monopoly profits are strictly positive when the monopolist holds the project for T(α) 
periods: 
.02/4/)1())]2)((/(2[
/2/)1())]2)((/(2[
2/)1(2/)1())]2)((/(2[
)|*(*)|*(*)|)((
)1/(
2
)1/(
*
2
)1/(
2
>−−++=
=−−−++>
>−−−−++
=≥>
−
−
−−
zkkrk
rzkkrk
ezkkrk
TTT
kk
L
kk
L
rTkk
δα
ωδα
ωδα
ωπωπωαπ
  (A8) 
Therefore, social welfare is strictly greater under indefinitely-renewable copyright.   
 
The optimality condition for an infinite-length copyright policy given heterogeneous 
products.   
Suppose z=0 and fix T.  Following the proof of proposition 1, W(∞)>W(T) if (A9) is satisfied.  
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Noting that eδT-e-(δ+r)T≥0, eδT≥1 and (1/(1-e-(δ+r)T))1/(k-1)≥1, equation (A9) simplifies to (A10).  
)1/(1)1/(
2
))(2(
)(6
][
][
−− +
+> kkk rk
rr
E
E
δ
δ
α
γ     (A10) 
 
34 
REFERENCES 
 
Akerlof, G., et al., 2002, “Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft,” 
United States Supreme Court, May 20, No. 01-618. 
 
Arrow, K., 1962, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Universities – 
National Bureau Conference Series, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Gilbert, R. and C. Shapiro, 1990, “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth,” The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 21(1):106-112. 
 
Heide, R., J. Gilman, M. Peterson, and P. White, 2001, Mickey Mouse: The Evolution, The 
Legend, The Phenomenon, Disney Editions, New York.  
 
Hirshleifer, J. and J. Riley, 1979, “The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information – an Expository 
Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 17(4):1375-1421. 
 
Hollis, R. and B. Sibley, 1986, Walt Disney’s Mickey Mouse: His Life and Times, Harper &Row 
Publishers, New York. 
 
Landes, W. and R. Posner, 2003, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,” University of Chicago 
Law Review, 70(2):471-518. 
 
Liebowitz, S. and S. Margolis, 2005, “Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: 
The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects,” Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology, 18(2):435-457. 
 
Nordhaus, W., 1969, Invention, Growth and Welfare. A Theoretical Treatment of Technological 
Change, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Novos, I. and M. Waldman, 1984, “The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic 
Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 92(2):236-246.  
 
Posner, R., 2005, “Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19(2):57-73. 
 
Rappaport, E., 2002, “Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values,” in John V. 
Martin (Editor), Copyright: Current Issues and Laws, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., New 
York. 
 
Scherer, F., 1972, “Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometrical Reinterpretation,” 
American Economic Review, 62(3):428-430. 
 
35 
Stanley, A., 2006, “For Today’s Preschooler, A Slick New Mickey Mouse,” New York Times, 
May 5, p. E26. 
 
Varian, H., 2005, “Copying and Copyright,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2):121-138. 
 
Wasko, J., 2001, Understanding Disney: The Manufacture of Fantasy, Blackwell Publishers, 
Inc., Malden, MA. 
 
Yuan, M., 2005. “A Better Copyright System? Comparing Welfare of Indefinitely Renewable 
Copyright Versus Fixed-Length Copyright,” mimeo, Gabelli School of Business, Roger 
Williams University. 
 
 
36 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
 
 A B C D 
αH 
αL 
γ 
ϕ 
z 
k 
δ 
R 
11 
1 
- 
0 
0.2 
3 
0.08 
0.08 
11 
1 
1.6 
0.01 
0.2 
3 
0.08 
0.08 
11 
1 
2.1 
0.01 
0.2 
3 
0.08 
0.08 
11 
1 
3 
0.01 
0.2 
3 
0.08 
0.08 
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Figure 1: The Dynamics of Monopolist’s Ex-Post Investment 
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Figure2: Normalized Expected Total Surplus Simulations 
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Figure 3: The Implications of CTEA for New Creative Works 
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Figure 4: The Implications of CTEA for Existing Works 
 
 
